On the American wars in Vietnam and Iraq

Newly-released secret documents reveal that the Bush administration is struggling with the same issues that faced the administration of Richard Nixon. The similarities are eerie. There are big differences to be sure. But note the similarities:

In 1995, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the architect of the American war in Vietnam, looked back and listed the major reasons for the failure of U.S. foreign policy there. Here are some of them:
--We misjudged the intention of our adversaries and we exaggerated the danger to the United States.
--We viewed the people and the leaders in terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for and a determination to fight for freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
--We underestimated the power of nationalism to motive a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values – and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.
--Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected profound ignorance of the history, culture and politics of the people in the area and the personalities and habits of their leaders.
--We failed to recognize the limits of modern, high technology military equipment, forces and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements.
--We failed to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of the people from a totally different culture.
--We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement before we initiated the action.
--After the action got underway and unanticipated events forces us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. We had not prepared the public to understand the complex events we faced and how to react constructively to the need for changes in course as the nation confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment.
--We did not recognize that neither our people nor its leaders are omniscient.
--We did not hold to the principle that US military action – other than in response to direct threats to our own security – should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces fully and not merely cosmetically, by the international community.
--We failed to understand that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems in which there is no immediate solution.
I am not the first to say this, but those who fail to study history are doomed to repeat it.